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Abstract 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the LL.M in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy Law at the International Hellenic 
University.  
The spectacular growth of the Internet has brought providers and users closer 
in both the commercial arena and private homes. Users employ search engines to find 
websites of interest, with linking, framing and browsing facilitating navigation from one 
webpage to another. These most attractive but also most problematic tools promote 
free access to information, and thus freedom of speech, but also create the risk of 
copyright infringement. In this context, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) has recently issued some interesting, yet controversial rulings in its attempt to 
clarify the complexity of conceptual definitions involved in linking, framing and 
browsing, as well as interpret EU copyright law. By doing so, the CJEU applied new 
criteria and construed the concept of exclusive rights of authors more or less 
restrictively depending on the actual facts of each case. However, what prevailed, it 
was the resounding victory of common sense. If this were not the case, then there 
would be the unsatisfactory and impractical consequence that internet users would not 
be able to link and browse on the internet without the copyright owner’s consent. To 
this end, one can only welcome the efforts of the CJEU in harmonizing EU copyright 
law. Taking into consideration that a correct balance between, on the one hand, strong 
protection of intellectual property rights so as to encourage creativity and investment 
and, on the other hand, the public interest in not allowing the monopoly or exclusive 
rights to extend too far, lies at the very heart of intellectual property law, the CJEU’ role 
in shaping EU copyright law was fundamental.  
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this Master’s thesis and for the useful comments, remarks and engagement through 
the drafting process. I also thank my parents for their patient and consistent 
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PREFACE  
During the past several years, the World Wide Web has observed two 
significant changes: (i) its popularity and use have literally exploded and (ii) it has 
become a place of substantial commercial activity. This being the case, certain 
practices by authors of websites and pages have been attacked as violative of other’s 
intellectual property rights or entitlements. These practices include “linking”, “framing” 
and “browsing”, which, despite promoting free access to information and thus, freedom 
of speech, raise concerns in the field of copyright law as far as the application and 
extension of the exclusive rights of authors.  
The aim of this dissertation is to highlight the copyright issues pertaining to 
linking, framing and browsing by presenting, initially, the main aspects of copyright law 
and specifically the Information Society Directive (2001/29/EC) and afterwards by 
summarizing and criticizing the most recent case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). In particular, chapter I will attempt to clarify the complexity of 
conceptual definitions which are involved in linking, framing and browsing and the main 
problems of copyright law that these practices create, while chapter II will outline and 
interpret the fundamental exclusive rights of copyright pursuant to the Information 
Society Directive and essentially the exclusive right of reproduction and the right of 
communication to the public. Chapter III will introduce the recent case law of the CJEU, 
by starting from Svensson, C More Entertainment AB and BestWater cases which 
served as background decisions for the judges to apply the theory of “new public” and 
“the communication to the public by same technical means” in linking and framing 
cases to end up to the most recent discussed GS Media case and the Meltwater case 
in order to evidence how complicated the treatment of this territory of law is. Finally, in 
the conclusion, this dissertation will attempt to assess the CJEU’s role in shaping EU 
copyright law and whether and to what extent the CJEU succeeded in balancing the 
different interests at stake. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite its brief history, the internet has grown exponentially and is accessed by 
individuals and business alike; a host of content providers, from local charities and 
government departments to multinational businesses, present information over the 
internet in an attempt to inform users or entice customers. Users add the internet to 
their armoury whether communicating with others by email or web chatting, or whether 
searching for reliable information or the best deals available.1 
The Internet, also known as the Web, is structured by a vast collection of 
interconnected digital documents called webpages. Each webpage has a unique 
address, namely the Uniform Resource Locator (URL)2, which functions much like a 
phone number. URLs are often long and therefore, easy to type incorrectly. However, 
it is not necessary to know every URL. Direct links from one webpage to another 
enable users to surf or browse, without having to memorize long lists of addresses.3  
There are, basically, three ways users can access webpages. These include 
access via links, through sites that frame other sites’ pages and with the aid of a 
software tool, i.e. the web browser.  
Links represent a fundamental instrument for programmers to build websites 
and for users to navigate the web. Thanks to links, websites interrelate to one another, 
thus making it possible for users to gather, with a simple click, information scattered 
around several locations on the web.4 Unlike linking, framing enables a website to 
make external websites visually perceptible embedded in a frame and surrounded by 
the host website’ s information. In this case, the referenced content is automatically 
displayed on the page invoking the content and is made accessible without any further 
                                                          
1 Deveci, A. H. (2014), Hyperlinks oscillating at the crossroad. Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review, pp.14.  
2 A Uniform Resource Locator (URL), commonly informally termed a web address, is a reference to a web 
resource that specifies its location on a computer network and a mechanism for retrieving it. A URL is a 
specific type of Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) (that is, a string of characters used to identify a 
resource), although many people use the two terms interchangeably. A URL implies the means to access 
an indicated resource, which is not true of every URI. URLs occur most commonly to reference web pages 
(http), but are also used for file transfer (ftp), email (mailto), database access (JDBC), and many other 
applications, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniform_Resource_Locator. 
3 Malama, G. (2013) Copyright aspects of linking and framing. International Hellenic University, 
Thessaloniki, pp.8.  
4 Arezzo, E. (2014) Hyperlinks and making available right in the European Union – what future for the 
Internet after Svensson? International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp.1. 
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act on the user’s side.5  Finally, browsing allows someone to access third parties’ 
websites and view, search and retrieve their content.  
Notwithstanding their attractiveness, linking, framing and browsing raise 
several copyright issues, which have been subject to controversy to this very day. For 
example, when an image link instructs the visiting users to follow the link and retrieve 
information from an official site, this retrieved information is grouped together in a new 
page and presented to the user as part of the same site. Although none of the images 
is stored within the new page, the resulting page arguably creates a new derivative 
work based on those pre-existing images. Such a link that frames the linked page, by 
substantially changing its original appearance, infringes the copyright of the author, if 
created without license.6 In addition, copyright legislation confers on the owner the 
exclusive right to reproduce, issue copies of, perform, broadcast or adapt the work. 
The parameters of these rights are well established in the real world, but the analysis 
of digital copyright raises the issue of so-called random access memory (RAM) copies. 
In the cyber world, whenever the information is retrieved, the digitized work is 
reproduced and/or stored in computer memory; the storage might be in RAM or in 
temporary cache files on magnetic media. Onward transmission on the internet might 
involve several intermediary machines as packages of information are routed and re-
routed before they reach their final destination. Accordingly, providing the work is 
substantive enough to attract copyright and the copying involves the taking of a 
substantial part, both the use of links as point of reference and the transmission or 
display of webpages might infringe the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.7 
To this end, even though linking, framing and browsing prove to be an excellent 
example of end-user conduct in the information society as they give rise to speedy and 
effective use of Internet., they may raise concerns with regard to various forms of 
liability for copyright infringement. That is to say, it is susceptible to grant access to 
content with a custom path even without prior consent of the entitled parties. Finding 
a balance among interests of different stakeholders is indispensable in this regard.8 
                                                          
5 Mezei, P. (2016) Enter the matrix: the effects of the CJEU’ s case law on linking and streaming 
technologies. Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice, pp.2. 
6 Sangal, T. (2010) IP issues in linking, framing and keyword linked advertising. Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review, pp.2. 
7 Deveci, A. H. (2004) Hyperlinks oscillating at the crossroads. Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review, pp.6.  
8 Headdon, T. (2016) An epilogue to Svensson: the same old new public and the worms that didn’ t turn. 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, pp.662.  
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This not only concerns a meaningful distinction between various web techniques but 
also the creation of harmony between copyright and other rights, or as the case may 
be, fundamental rights. 
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CHAPTER I: BASICS ON LINKING AND BROWSING 
1. LINKING: DEFINITION AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
As stated above, linking represents the first of the three most common ways of 
accessing the web content. A link is an electronic address written into a webpage that 
points to another location on either the same or a different page, at either the current 
or a remote site on the internet. Essentially, a link in the form of text or a graphic is a 
shortcut to scrolling on the screen or typing in the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of 
a document already posted somewhere on the internet.9 This being the case, linking 
allows a website user to visit another location on the Internet. By simply clicking on a 
live word or image in one webpage, the user can view another webpage elsewhere in 
the world, or simply elsewhere on the same server as the original page. 
The links can be divided on the basis of: 
 Depth – surface and deep linking: while surface linking connects only to the 
home page of a site, deep linking bypasses the home page and goes straight 
to an internal page within the linked site. This leads to diversion of traffic from 
the main home page.  
 Visibility – normal and embedded linking: while normal links are visible to the 
user as a traversal between two documents, an embedded link, i.e. images, 
embedded objects and background sounds and images which are part of a 
given document, divert the user without his or her apparent knowledge to a 
different location when he or she clicks on the said object. 
 Programming – hypertext reference linking and image linking: while the 
hypertext reference link instructs a browser to stop viewing content transmitted 
from one location and begin viewing that of another, an image link instructs a 
visiting browser to supplement the text on the current page with an image 
contained in a separate image file. This can also be used to navigate to a 
different location on the same site or to a different site altogether. Again, a user 
following a hypertext link is usually aware that he has “changed pages” from 
the different appearance of the newly accessed page or from the change in the 
URL address display in the web browser.10 
 
                                                          
9 Deveci, A. H. (2004) Hyperlinks oscillating at the crossroads. Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review, pp.2. 
10 Sangal, T. (2010) IP issues in linking, framing and keyword linked advertising. Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review, pp.1-2. 
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Linking is an attractive and powerful tool used on the net, which promote free 
access to information. It proves to be an excellent example of end - user conduct in 
the information society as it gives rise to speedy and effective use of Internet.11 The 
Executive Committee of the ALAI12 has noted that “generally speaking, hypertext links 
make it easier for the user to search the internet, as he or she can click on the link 
instead of copying and pasting or writing the relevant web address. This is an 
improvement upon merely providing its factual address, i.e. information on the name 
of the file and where it is stored. Consequently, links facilitate availability, although 
users can also access the desired works through other means”.13 Similarly, the 
attraction of linking is in the ability to access information that would otherwise take 
considerable time to trace while it allows the user to determine the depth of his or her 
enquiry; the more links activated, the deeper is the exploration of the content.14  
Although linking is the driving force of the internet, it may give rise to several 
copyright issues. For instance, deep-linking, as overpasses a site’ s home or front page 
by connecting a user directly to secondary material of another site, may amount to an 
infringement of copyright in the secondary material. Similarly, an embedded link, as 
encompasses a reference to content from another website, the secondary material 
appears to be content originating from the first site. In this respect, such links may 
violate the author’ s right to display or communicate their work to the public, as they 
do not require a copy to be made of the linked material.15 Accordingly, surface linking 
might raise concerns about both direct and indirect liability, when the linked website 
contains either material that has been uploaded without the authors’ consent or tools 
facilitating the unauthorized retrieval of copyright content.16 
                                                          
11 Mezei, P. (2016) Enter the matrix: the effects of the CJEU’ s case law on linking and streaming 
technologies. Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice, pp.1. 
12 The International Literary and Artistic Association (ALAI) is an independent learned society dedicated 
to studying and discussing legal issues arising in connection with the protection of the interests of creative 
individuals, http://www.alai.org/en/presentation.html.  
13 Association Litteraire et Artistique Internationale (2014) Report and Opinion on the making available 
and communication to the public in the internet environment: focus on linking techniques on the Internet. 
European Intellectual Property Review, pp.153.  
14 Deveci, A. H. (2004) Hyperlinks oscillating at the crossroads. Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review, pp.3. 
15 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (2002) Intellectual Property on the Internet: A survey 
of issues htpp://ecommerce.wipo.int. 
16 Arezzo, E. (2014) Hyperlinks and making available right in the European Union – what future for the 
Internet after Svensson? International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp. 3. 
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2. FRAMING: DEFINITION AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
Related to linking is the practice of framing, which takes place whenever a link placed 
within a certain webpage, instead of opening a new browser window leading to the 
linked page, permits users to see the content of the linked page within the former 
website, displaying it within a frame.17  
Framing is a method of organizing the visual display of the information either 
composed or retrieved; it is the HTML18 command splitting the screen into smaller 
windows or frames. Each frame occupies a different portion of the screen and functions 
independently of the other, thus enabling the user to simultaneously view as many 
webpages as there are frames. The simplest example would be there the screen is 
split vertically, whereby the left window displays the index and the right shows the 
detailed contents. By clicking on a section of the index on the left, the linked text or 
image is displayed on the right, but without upsetting the appearance of the window 
on the left.19 
Framing enables a viewer to see the screen split in several smaller windows. 
Each window is displayed on a separate portion of the screen and functions 
independently to display an individual webpage. This enables the user to maximize the 
possibilities of his computer when surfing the web.20 Framing, as such, is of no legal 
concern unless the author of a site frames contents of another site into his own 
website, creates a new page and eliminates the advertising or other content including 
the site identifier from the page. In such a case, it gives rise to liability for infringement 
of intellectual property. In particular, when a user clicks on a framed URL, the user’ s 
browser transmits the content of the selected URL and the content appears within the 
portion of the screen designated as its frame. The legal implications are similar to that 
of linking. The consumer is likely to believe that some endorsement is in fact provided 
by the original websites to the framed one and might indicate the same to be a 
derivative work.21 
                                                          
17 Arezzo, E. (2014) Hyperlinks and making available right in the European Union – what future for the 
Internet after Svensson? International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp.2.  
18 HTML is the standard markup language for creating Web pages.   
19 Deveci, A. H. (2004) Hyperlinks oscillating at the crossroads Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review, pp.3. 
20 Garrote, I. J. (2002) Linking and framing: a comparative law approach. European Intellectual Property 
Review, pp.2.  
21 Sangal, T. (2010) IP issues in linking, framing and keyword linked advertising. Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review, pp.3. 
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3. BROWSING: DEFINITION AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
Browsing is related to the access in webpages of other owners and viewing of their 
content. In this way, multiple temporary copies are created on the screen of the user’s 
computer and in the “cache memory” of the hard drive of that computer.  
Browsing the internet requires the participation of the content provider, who 
may or may not be the author or copyright owner, the internet service providers whose 
servers function as host and/or access providers and the user. Particularly, the content 
provider posts the information on a host server. The page posted may consist of text, 
images or sounds and may contain a variety of links to files on the same or different 
servers. When the user requests a page by writing the URL or activating a link, the 
user’s access server contacts the host and having received a copy of the page from 
the host server, makes a temporary copy of the file requested before transmitting the 
same to the user. In turn, the user’ s computer makes a temporary copy in its RAM in 
order to display the contents on the screen. The keeping of temporary copies in RAM 
of pages visited in order to allow the user to revisit those pages without having to recall 
the texts or images from the host server might invoke caching.22 So far, the host retains 
a permanent temporary copy, the access server makes a temporary copy in order to 
transmit and the user makes a temporary copy to view or to obviate the need for further 
requests regarding the same page. If unauthorized, hosting will infringe copyright.23 
There has not been any uniform jurisprudence by the courts of the EU Member 
States on the aforementioned issues. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(hereinafter CJEU) has recently dealt in a number of cases with the issues above and 
we shall discuss those cases later on this paper. We shall now turn to outlining the 
                                                          
22 Caching (etymologically related to French “cacher”: to hide) is the automatic creation of temporary 
copies of digital data (in a “cache”) in order to make the more readily available for subsequent use. On 
the internet, caching emulates bandwidth whereas it reduces congestion on popular websites. Although 
caching is a sine qua non to the internet’ s survival and continuing growth it is equally clear that caching 
has the potential of negatively affecting the interests of authors and rightholders in documents cached. 
Caching may result in the supply of “stale” documents, if caches are not regularly refreshed. Also, caching 
may prevent content providers from collecting potentially valuable usage data by setting “cookies” that 
track consumer behavior. Finally, caching may undermine conditional access services, if subscriber-only 
documents are left in caches for all to retrieve, Hugenholtz, P. B. (2000) Caching and copyright: the right 
of temporary copying. European Intellectual Property Review, pp.1.  
23 Deveci, A. H. (2004) Hyperlinks oscillating at the crossroads. Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review, pp.6.  
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European copyright law in relation to the fundamental exclusive rights of holders and 
exceptions to those rights.  
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CHAPTER II: THE INFORMATION SOCIETY DIRECTIVE (2001/29/EC) 
1.AN OVERVIEW 
On April 9, 2001, the Directive on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society (hereinafter the Information Society 
Directive)24 was adopted. The Directive, which had to be implemented by the Member 
States by December 22, 2002, had two principal aims. First, to bring further 
harmonization to European copyright law in relation to fundamental exclusive rights of 
copyright and exceptions to those rights and secondly, to implement the two 1996 
World Intellectual Property Organization Treaties on Copyright and on Performances 
and Phonograms. To achieve its goals, the Information Society  Directive provided for 
the following: (1) the harmonization of three fundamental exclusive rights, these being 
the reproduction right, the communication to the public right and the distribution right 
(Articles 2,3 and 4); (2) the introduction of an exhaustive list of copyright exceptions, 
all of which are optional except one, subject to the three-test step (Article 5); and (3) 
the introduction of obligations to protect circumvention of technical measures, 
designed to prevent infringement of copyright and the removal of rights management 
information (Articles 6 and 7).25  
 
2.THE REPRODUCTION RIGHT 
Recital 21 of the Information Society Directive emphasizes the necessity to define the 
concept of reproduction in conformity with the acquis communautaire26 and in a broad 
sense in order to ensure legal certainty within the internal market”. The broad definition 
of the reproduction right is provided in article 2 of the Information Society Directive 
requiring Member States to “provide for the exclusive right to authorize or prohibit direct 
or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in 
whole or in part…”. The reproduction right is expressed to be for authors in respect of 
their works, performers in respect of their performances, phonogram producers in 
                                                          
24 Directive 2001/29 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society [2001] OJ 2001 
L 167, pp. 10. 
25 Hart, M. (2002) The Copyright in the Information Society Directive: an overview. European Intellectual 
Property Review, pp.1.  
26 The Community acquis or acquis communautaire sometimes called the EU acquis and often shortened 
to acquis, is the accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which constitute the body of 
European Union law. The term is French: acquis meaning "that which has been acquired or obtained", 
and communautaire meaning "of the community", https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acquis_communautaire. 
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respect of their phonograms, film producers of the first fixations of films in respect of 
originals and copies of their films and for broadcasting organizations in respect of 
fixations of their broadcasts, whether transmitted by wire or air, including cable and 
satellite transmissions.27  
However, to counterbalance such a broad definition (i.e. any form of permanent 
and temporary copying) the Information Society Directive provides in article 5(1) a 
mandatory exception specifying that temporary acts of copying are to be exempted 
from the scope of reproduction right when they are: “transient or incidental and an 
integral and essential part of a technological process and whose sole purpose is to 
enable: (a) a transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary, or (b) 
a lawful use of a work or other subject matter to be made and which have no 
independent economic significance…”.28 This exception will be discussed further 
below.  
3. THE COMMUNICATION TO THE PUBLIC RIGHT  
3.1. Content, scope and interpretation 
The communication to the public right protects the transmission and distribution of 
copyright works other than in physical form to members of the public not present at the 
place where the communication originates. It covers communication to the public of 
copyright works via online means of distribution, such as the internet or by 
broadcasting. There is no definition in the Information Society Directive of what is a 
public or private communication, though it is clarified in Recital 27 of the Directive that 
merely providing the physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does 
not in itself comprise a communication.29  
In the case of Broadcasting LtD and others V TV Catchup Ltd (No 2) (Case C-
607/11)30, the CJEU noted that Directive 2001/29 does not define the concept of 
                                                          
27 Hart, M. (2002) The Copyright in the Information Society Directive: an overview. European Intellectual 
Property Review, pp.2. 
28 Renta, A., Simoneli, F., Mazzioti, G., Bolognini, A. and Luchetta, G. (2015) The implementation, 
application and effects of the EU Directive on copyright in the information society. Centre for European 
Policy Studies, European Union, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR120_0.pdf, pp.21. 
29 Hart, M. (2002) The Copyright in the Information Society Directive: an overview. European Intellectual 
Property Review, pp.2.  
30 Case C-607/11 ITV Broadcasting Ltd and others v TV Catchup Ltd (No 2). Court of Justice of the 
European Union (2013). 
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“communication” exhaustively. Thus, the meaning and scope of that concept must be 
defined in the light of the context in which it occurs and also in the light of the principal 
objective of the Directive to establish a high level of protection of authors, allowing 
them to obtain an appropriate reward for the use of their works, including on the 
occasion of the communication to the public. It follows, then, that “communication to 
the public” must be interpreted broadly, as Recital 2331 in the Preamble of the 
Information Society Directive expressly states.  
In order for “communication to the public” to take place, some sort of 
“transmission” (or retransmission) is necessary. As it is characterized by a distance 
element in the sense that the transmission originates from one place and is received 
in another, the right of communication to the public shall include TV and radio 
broadcasting, Internet TV and radio, simulcasting, webcasting, streaming, near-video-
on demand (NVOD), pay-per-view, near-on-demand-pay TV, pod-casting as well as 
cable and online transmissions in general.32 
Indeed, article 3.1 of the Information Society Directive gives authors an 
exclusive right to permit any communication of their works by wire or wireless means, 
including making them available to the public in such a way that members of the public 
may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them (e.g. online, 
on-demand services). However, the right of performers, record and film producers and 
broadcasters are limited under article 3.2 only to acts of making available their 
performances, phonograms, films and broadcasts in such a way that members of the 
public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. 
Accordingly, record and film producers are not given control over the broadcast of their 
works other than through on-demand services.33 
 
                                                          
31“This Directive should harmonize further the author’ s right of communication to the public. This right 
should be understood in a broad sense covering all communication to the public not present at the place 
where the communication originates. This right should cover any such transmission or retransmission of 
a work to the public by wire or wireless means, including broadcasting. This right should not cover any 
other acts”, Recital 23 of the Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright 
and related rights in the information society.  
32 Stamatoudi, I. and Torremans, P. (2014) EU Copyright Law. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham 
(UK) – Northampton (US), pp.408-409.  
33 Hart, M. (2002) The Copyright in the Information Society Directive: an overview. European Intellectual 
Property Review, pp.2. 
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3.2 The making available right: content and components 
The Information Society Directive categorizes the right of making available to the public 
as one component of a more general right of communication to the public. In particular, 
article 3 of the Information Society Directive introduces the right of “making available 
to the public” for authors and for the four types of related rights holders regulated in 
EU law, i.e. performers, phonogram producers, producers of the first fixations of films 
and broadcasting organizations.34 The right to make available is limited to methods of 
interactive users, of availability on demand. It applies when the work is accessible for 
members of the public, irrespective of whether and how often it is actually accessed. 
Examples include offering for download or streaming of a work from an online store or 
a pay-per-view television channel, as much as offering (sharing) music or video files 
over a peer-to-peer file-sharing television.35  
The concept of “making available” set out in article 3.1 of the Information 
Society Directive necessarily encompasses not only the actual transmission of a work 
to members of the public, but especially the offering to the public to access the work 
on demand. The phrase “may access”36 indicates that actual access to the work by a 
member of the public may occur at a later time or not at all.37 The right covers the 
offering to the public of a work for individualized streaming or downloading; in addition, 
where it takes place, the actual transmission of a work to members of the public also 
is covered both irrespective of the technical means used for making available. In 
essence, what matters is that the act (i) is performed by an individual person (ii) directly 
or indirectly has the distinct effect of addressing the public, irrespective of the tool used 
                                                          
34 Stamatoudi, I. (2014) ‘Linking’, ‘Framing’ and ‘Browsing’. The EU Court of Justice’ s Recent Case Law.  
Offprint of article from LIBER AMICORUM JAN ROSEN, pp.761.  
35 Association Litteraire et Artistique Internationale (2014) Report and Opinion on the making available 
and communication to the public in the internet environment: focus on linking techniques on the Internet, 
European Intellectual Property Review, pp.2.  
36 Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to 
the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their 
works in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them, Article 3.1 of the Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society.  
37 Ginsburg, C. J. (2014) Hyperlinking and “making available”. European Intellectual Property Review, 
pp.1. 
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by the individual, and (iii) concerns subject matter protected by copyright or related 
rights.38 
3.3 Principle of exhaustion 
Both the making available right and the right of communication by wire or wireless 
means are not subject to the principle of exhaustion.39 The circumstance that the 
making available right is not subject to exhaustion bears two significant consequences. 
On the one hand, it entails that, once certain copyright content is uploaded on the 
internet, this act of making it available does not exhaust the holder’ s right to further 
disseminate the work through a different communication medium, such as by cable or 
satellite. On the other hand, it further implies that if and when users who enjoy works 
made available on the interest also download them on tangible equipment, they cannot 
further distribute such copies in the digital environment without express authorization, 
as such action would violate copyright holder’ s making available right.40 
3.4 The notion of “public” 
In order for the right of communication to the public or the making available right to 
take place, it is essential that the act of transmission reaches a number of persons that 
can be qualified as the public. The notion of “public” is not defined in the Information 
Society Directive or any other relevant EU legal instrument, however, extensive case 
law of the CJEU has dealt with it.  
Basically, the idea of public must be understood as covering all environments 
implicating a substantial number of persons beyond the confines of family circles and 
close friends. This means that copyright relevant communication may occur at any 
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal family circle and its 
social acquaintances are gathered. This embraces all places which are “open” to the 
public without restrictions, other than generally applicable restrictions such as an 
admission free or a membership card imposed on the public at large. Hence 
communication acts, like performance or display, in public as well as semipublic 
                                                          
38Association Litteraire et Artistique Internationale (2014) Report and Opinion on the making available and 
communication to the public in the internet environment: focus on linking techniques on the Internet.  
European Intellectual Property Review, pp.1.  
39 See Art. 3(3) of the Information Society Directive.  
40 Arezzo, E. (2014) Hyperlinks and making available right in the European Union – what future for the 
Internet after Svensson? International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp.6.  
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places, such as bars, clubs, hotels, lodges, factories and schools subject to more 
specific entry conditions, may also constitute communications to the public.41 
However, the notion of the public contemplated by these exclusive rights does 
not presume a physical gathering of people in the same place to jointly enjoy the work, 
but rather presupposes a fragmented notion of the public. Works broadcast by wire or 
wireless means, as well as works made accessible on the internet, exhibit the peculiar 
feature that they are generally received by single users and experienced in the privacy 
of their homes. In any case, what is essential for this requirement to be met is that the 
act of transmission is performed in such a way as to potentially reach an indeterminate 
but fairly large number of potential viewers. What is important is not the (economic) 
relevance of the single user, but the cumulative effect created by the number of people 
who simultaneously or in succession may access the work.42 
The CJEU has decided that the concept of communication to the public within 
the meaning of article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive covers a retransmission 
of the works included in a terrestrial television broadcast, where the retransmission is 
made by an organization other than the original broadcaster and by means of an 
internet stream made available to the subscribers of that other organization who may 
receive that retransmission by logging on to its server, even though those subscribers 
are within the area of reception of that terrestrial broadcast and may lawfully receive 
the broadcast on a television receiver. Further, the CJEU noted that communication to 
the public was neither influenced by the fact that retransmission is funded by 
advertising and is therefore of a profit-making nature, nor by the fact that the 
retransmission was made by an organization which is acting in direct competition with 
the original broadcaster.43 
 
                                                          
41 Association Litteraire et Artistique Internationale (2014) Report and Opinion on the making available 
and communication to the public in the internet environment: focus on linking techniques on the Internet.   
European Intellectual Property Review, pp.4. 
42 Arezzo, E. (2014) Hyperlinks and making available right in the European Union – what future for the 
Internet after Svensson? International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp.5. 
43 See TVCatchup (2013) Bus. L.R 1020 at (42)-(44). It should be observed that the CJEU in Premier 
League and Murphy (2012) Bus. L.R. 1321 at (204), found it “not irrelevant” that communication within the 
meaning of art. 3 (1) of Directive 2001/29 is of a “profitmaking nature”. In its TVCatchup decision the CJEU 
reduces this; a profit-making nature of a communication is “not necessarily an essential condition for the 
existence of a communication to the public”; (2013) Bus. L.R 1020 at (42).  
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4. COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS  
4.1 The mandatory exception for temporary copying 
Pursuant to article 5(1) of the Information Society Directive “temporary acts of 
reproduction referred to in Article 2, which are transient or incidental [and] an integral 
and essential part of a technological process and whose sole purpose is to enable: (a) 
a transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary, or (b) a lawful 
use of a work or other subject-matter to be made, and which have no independence 
economic significance, shall be exempted from the reproduction right provided for in 
Article 2”.  
The article 5(1) temporary copying exception is the sole mandatory counter – 
balance to the broad definition of reproduction right. The article 5(1) conditions are 
cumulative, so non-compliance with any of them will mean that the act falls outside the 
exception and as they derogate from a general right, the conditions must be interpreted 
strictly. It contains a number of terms which are not defined clear in EU legislation. 
However, the Recitals to the Information Society Directive give some further guidance 
in relation to the policy behind and interpretation of this exception.44 
Apart from Recitals 4, 9 and 31 that defend the high level of protection of 
intellectual property and the safeguard of rights and interests between the different 
categories of rightholders and users of protected subject-matter, Recital 33 provides 
that this exception covers browsing of content as well as acts of caching (e.g. the 
temporary storage of digital data to make the transmission of data easier and avoid 
network congestion by too much data being transmitted at the same time). However, 
it does not make it clear that browsing is actually permitted as it states that the 
conditions of Article 5(1) must still be met.45 Recital 33 also expands on what “lawful 
use” in part (b) of the fourth condition means, stating that: “A use should be considered 
lawful where it is authorized by the rightholder or not restricted by law”. A use can 
therefore be lawful even if not authorized by the right owner provided that such a use 
is not unlawful in itself. This permission for lawful uses is an extremely important 
element of article 5(1), as it serves to ensure that acts which where lawful in the non-
                                                          
44 Hart, M. (2014) The legality of internet browsing in the digital age. European Intellectual Property 
Review, pp.1-3. 
45 Hart, M. (2002) The Copyright in the Information Society Directive: an overview. European Intellectual 
Property Review, pp.3. 
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digital world are not rendered unlawful in the digital world simply because temporary 
copies are an inherent part of the operation of digital technology. 46 
4.2 The optional exceptions 
In article 5 sub-paras 2 and 3 of the Information Society Directive there is a list of 
twenty optional exceptions from the reproduction and communication to the public 
rights, whose application is left entirely to the discretion of the individual Member 
States. The list is exhaustive, so any existing exception which does not fall within the 
exhaustive list has to be removed or modified and no new exceptions may be 
introduced unless they fall within the listed exceptions.47 
The exhaustive character of this list is clarified under Recital 32 of the 
Information Society Directive, which states expressly that “this Directive provides for 
an exhaustive enumeration of exceptions and limitations to the reproduction right and 
the right of communication to the public. Some exceptions or limitations only apply to 
the reproduction right, where appropriate. This list takes due account of the different 
legal traditions in Member States, while, at the same time, aiming to ensure a 
functioning internal market. Member States should arrive at a coherent application of 
these exceptions and limitations, which will be assessed when reviewing implementing 
legislation in the future”.  
4.3 The three-step test 
Article 5(5) of the Information Society Directive provides that the exceptions and 
limitations in sub-paras 5(1)-(4) “shall only be applied in certain special cases which 
do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder”.  
This provision is regarded as essential by copyright holders and, more in 
general, by the creative industries insofar as it confines the implementation of 
exceptions and limitations to special cases which do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the protected work and do not cause an unreasonable prejudice for the 
legitimate interests of the copyright holder. In short, the test makes sure that 
exceptions and limitations do not end up affecting unreasonably (i.e. excessively) the 
market for the copyrighted work. What is still unclear, is whether the test should be 
                                                          
46 Hart, M. (2014) The legality of internet browsing in the digital age. European Intellectual Property 
Review, pp.3. 
47 Hart, M. (2002) The Copyright in the Information Society Directive: an overview. European Intellectual 
Property Review, pp.3. 
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regarded just as a set of (mandatory) requirements for Member States that codify their 
own national exceptions under their laws or also (and most important) as a binding test 
for national courts when they evaluate and apply the exception stemming from article 
5 of the Information Society Directive.48  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
48 Renta, A., Simoneli, F., Mazzioti, G., Bolognini, A. and Luchetta, G. (2015) The implementation, 
application and effects of the EU Directive on copyright in the information society. Centre for European 
Policy Studies, European Union, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR120_0.pdf, pp.29. 
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CHAPTER III: CASE LAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION   
1.LINKING 
1.1 THE SVENSSON CASE (C-466/12)49 
On February 13, 2014, the CJEU handed down its judgment on the application of 
Directive 2001/29/EC to hyperlinking answering essentially the question of whether the 
act of linking, by anyone other than – nor authorized by – the copyright holder, may 
amount to a violation of the making available right as introduced in national laws 
pursuant to article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive.50 
1.1.1 The facts of the case 
The case involved Nils Svensson and three other Swedish journalists whose press 
articles were published in the Goteborgs-Posten newspaper and on the newspaper’ s 
freely accessible website. As holders of copyright in their written works, Mr. Svensson 
and the other journalists brought an action before the Swedish courts against Retriever 
Sverige AB, a Swedish website providing hyperlinks to the articles. The claim for 
compensation was dismissed at first instance by the Stockholm District Court, a 
decision that Mr. Svensson and his colleagues appealed to the Svea Court of Appeal 
in Stockholm, which in turn, referred various questions to the CJEU. 
1.1.2 The referral 
The main issue examined by the CJEU was whether the inclusion on a company’ s 
website of clickable links redirecting users to works freely available on another website 
constitutes an “act of communication to the public” within the meaning of Article 3(1) 
of the Information Society Directive.51 52 
                                                          
49 Case C-466/12 Nils Svensson v Retriever Sverige AB, Request for a preliminary ruling from the Svea 
hovrätt (Sweden), lodged on 18 October 2012. 
50 Arezzo, E. (2014) Hyperlinks and making available right in the European Union – what future for the 
Internet after Svensson? International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp. 3. 
51 Stamatoudi, I. (2014) ‘Linking’, ‘Framing’ and ‘Browsing’. The EU Court of Justice’ s Recent Case Law.  
Offprint of article from LIBER AMICORUM JAN ROSEN, pp.770. 
52 The questions that were referred to the Court of Justice are set out below: 
(1) “If anyone other than the holder of copyright in a certain work supplies a clickable link to the work on 
his website, does that constitute communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the 
Copyright Directive? 
(2) Is the assessment under question 1 affected if the work to which the link refers is on a website on the 
Internet which can be accessed by anyone without restrictions or if access is restricted in some way? 
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1.1.3 The judgment 
“An act of communication” 
The CJEU concluded that article 3(1) of the Information Society Directive requires two 
cumulative criteria: first, an “act of communication” of a copyright work and, secondly, 
the communication of that work to a “public”.  
Specifically, the CJEU mentioned that the notion of an “act of communication” 
must be construed broadly, referring to any transmission of the protected works, 
irrespective of the technical means or process used to transmit them. In addition, it   
held that an “an act of communication” occurs when a work is made available to a 
public in such a way that the persons forming that public may access it, irrespective of 
whether they avail themselves of that opportunity.53 
Communication to a “new public” 
In assessing whether a protected work has been communicated to a “public”, the CJEU 
introduced the theory of the “new public”, namely a public that was not taken into 
account by the copyright holders at the time the copyright work was published on the 
internet initially. Thus, since the original communication of the applicants’ press articles 
(undertaken with their consent) allowed free availability to all users of the internet, there 
was no communication to a “new public”.54 In addition, the fact that the material 
                                                          
(3) When making the assessment under question 1, should any distinction be drawn between a case 
where the work, after the user has clicked on the link, is shown on another website and one where 
the work, after the user has clicked on the link, is shown in such a way as to give the impression that 
it is appearing on the same website? 
(4) Is it possible for a Member State to give wider protection to authors’ exclusive right by enabling 
communication to the public to cover a greater range of acts than provided for in Article 3(1) of the 
Copyright Directive?” 
53 See para 19 of the Svensson judgment: “As is apparent from Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29, for there 
to be an “act of communication”, it is sufficient, in particular, that a work is made available to a public in 
such a way that the persons forming that public may access it, irrespective of whether they avail 
themselves of that opportunity (see, by analogy, Case C-306/05 SGAE (2006) ECR I-11519, paragraph 
43)”.  
54 Baker, A.  (2014) EU Copyright Directive: can a hyperlink be a “communication to the public”? Computer 
and Telecommunications Law Review, pp.2. 
20 
 
appeared to the user to be on the defendant’ s site rather than on the originating site 
did not alter this conclusion. 55  
However, the CJEU held that the use of hyperlinks would be directed to a new 
public (and hence in breach of the communication right) if their use circumvented 
restrictions on the originating site which had been put in place to protect works and 
restrict public access, since these users would not have been contemplated (“taken 
into account”) by the copyright holders when originally posting their works on such a 
site.56 
1.1.4 Conclusions 
In summary, in the Svensson case the CJEU confirmed that providing a hyperlink to a 
copyright – protected work is an act of communication to the public for copyright 
purposes, i.e. it potentially infringes copyright. However, to infringe, the hyperlink must 
direct a “new public” to the work, that is to say, a public that was not taken into account 
by the copyright holder at the time the initial communication was authorized. Therefore, 
as a matter of copyright law, the owner of a website may, without the authorization of 
the copyright holders, redirect internet users, via hyperlinks, to copyright works 
available on a freely accessible basis on another site, but if the protected work is not 
available on a freely accessible basis (for example because of access restrictions), 
then, if the hyperlink enables users to circumvent any restrictions, the act of 
hyperlinking would infringe the copyright in the work.57 
1.1.5 Implications of the CJEU’ s judgment 
Undoubtfully, the CJEU’ s judgement in the Svensson case is ground-breaking, as it 
almost inevitably immunizes linking from copyright liability. However, four separate 
issues have been heavily disputed by commentators.  
 
 
 
                                                          
55 Moir, A., Montagnon, R. and Newton, H. (2014) Communication to the public: the CJEU finds linking to 
material already “freely available” cannot be restricted by copyright owners: Nils Svensson and Others v 
Retriever Sverige AB (C-466/12). European Intellectual Property Review, pp.1.  
56 Ibid, p.1. 
57 Baker, A. (2014) EU Copyright Directive: can a hyperlink be a “communication to the public”? Computer 
and Telecommunications Law Review, pp.5. 
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Is it linking communication/making available to the public? 
The first issue is the total imbalance in the time and space the CJEU devoted to 
analyzing the two constituent elements of the making available right, that is to say, the 
transmission of the work and the way a work is accessed.  
In particular, the CJEU’s reasoning started with the clear-cut assertion that the 
provision of clickable link leading to a protected work must be deemed an act of 
communication and it quickly moved to access the element of “new public”. In other 
words, the idea that linking is regarded as an act of communication of copyrighted 
content, which is a statement of crucial relevance in the legal assessment of linking 
practices, was not explained by any in-depth legal reasoning. The Court only asserted 
that if linking has the effect of making the work available in such a way that the public 
may access it, it then constitutes an act of communication.58 59 60 
Is the theory of “new public” correct? 
The second issue that the CJEU held in the Svensson case was the concept of the 
“new public” defined it as the public that was not taken into account by the copyright 
holders when they authorized the initial communication to the public. This definition  
involves an apparently subjective test, making the copyright holder’ s consent a crucial 
                                                          
58 Arezzo, E. (2014) Hyperlinks and making available right in the European Union – what future for the 
Internet after Svensson? International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp.6. 
59 The Executive Committee of the ALAI has stated that “links which lead directly to specific protected 
material, thereby using its unique URL, fall normally within the framework of a copyright use. This kind of 
linking is thus a “making available” regardless of whether the link takes the user to specific content in a 
way that makes it clear to the user that she has been taken to a third-party website, or whether the linking 
site retains a frame around the content so that the user is not aware that she is accessing the content 
from a third-party website”, Mezei, P. (2016) Enter the matrix: the effects of the CJEU’ s case law on 
linking and streaming technologies. Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice, pp.11. 
60 The European Copyright Society has argued – prior to the publication of the Svensson ruling -that 
linking may not be regarded as communication of copyrighted content, since data transmission is a 
prerequisite for that use. The Society has opined that under the text of InfoSocDirective and its preparatory 
documents, the CJEU’s former jurisprudence and domestic court decisions, communication to the public 
requires an act of intervention on the part of the person providing transmission. This intervention means 
that the protected content is transmitted to the receiving party by wire or wireless means. In case of linking, 
however, transmission of the work does not take place, the link only “directs” to the recourse location of 
the content, Bently, L., Derclaye, E., Dinwoodie, B.G., Dreier, Th., Dussolier, S., Geiger, C., Griffiths, J., 
Hilty, R., Hugenholtz, P.B., Jansses, M.C., Kretschmer, M., Metzger, A., Peukert, A., Ricolfi, M., 
Senftleben, M.,  Strowel, A., Vivant, M., Xalabarder, R. (2013) The Reference to the CJEU in Case C-
466/12 Svensson. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cmf?abstract_id=2220326, pp.2-6, 151.  
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factor in determining who formed the initial public for the purposes of the initial 
communication of work.61 This, in turn, raises the question whether, in cases where 
the initial communication to the public was not authorized by the copyright holder (so 
that the initial communication was itself an infringing act), it is not possible to say that 
any later communication is to a “new public”, since the copyright holder could not have 
“taken into account” any public in respect of the initial (illegal) communication. As such, 
it is likely that demonstrating a communication of a copyright work to an “new public” 
will not be an absolute requirement in all cases involving hyperlinks to copyright works 
post-Svensson but will apply only where the copyright holder has in fact authorized the 
initial communication of the work to a freely available website.62 
Similarities with the Implied License Doctrine 
The reference to the circumstance that the protected work had been released to the 
public with no restriction measures as a crucial element to exclude liability of third 
parties’ linking activities brings to mind echoes of the implied license doctrine.  
Pursuant to the implied license doctrine, certain conduct, not expressly 
authorized by the rightholder, should be deemed lawful when it has generated in third 
parties, acting in good faith, the impression that the rightholder has implicitly agreed to 
such conduct.63 Adapted to copyright and the linking discourse, application of the 
implied license doctrine leads to the conclusion that no permission is required from the 
website owner before making a link to his site since the owner of a website is in fact 
giving an implied license to link when he poses a document on the web. The owner 
knows that the web is navigated by links and linking is by far more usual way to access 
a document posted on the net. The user is not a direct infringer and the author of the 
link cannot be a contributory infringer. The mere fact of the publication of a website 
amounts to creating an implied license, because the whole point of the internet is to 
able to link to other sites.64 In this context, the legality of linking can be also inferred 
                                                          
61 In order for a hyperlink provider to prove that its provision of links is not infringing, it must show not only 
that the work is freely available on another website but also that the work has been initially communicated 
by the copyright holder with his or her consent.  
62 Baker, A.  (2014) EU Copyright Directive: can a hyperlink be a “communication to the public”? Computer 
and Telecommunications Law Review, pp.3. 
63 Pihlajarinne, T. (2012) Setting the Limits for the Implied Licence in Copyright and Linking Discourse: 
the European Perspective. International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp.700-
710.   
64 Garrote, I. J. (2002) Linking and framing: a comparative law approach. European Intellectual Property 
Review, pp.3-4.  
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from the circumstance that the owner of the material has not implemented any 
technical measure, amongst the many available, to prevent linking.65 
The implied license doctrine is mostly encountered in common law jurisdictions, 
however, the solution of assuming an implied license has been applied in several 
Member States.66 For example, in British Leyland v Armstrong Patents67, the claimant, 
whose patent had expired, argued that by manufacturing exhaust pipes for British 
Leyland cars, Armstrong infringed British Leyland’ s copyright in the drawings for their 
exhaust pipes. The House of Lords held that a manufacturer grants to the purchaser 
of a car an implied license to undertake necessary repairs himself or acquire the “spare 
part” from the most competitive supplier, in this case Armstrong. By analogy, the user 
may argue that web publishing on an open network propounds an implied license to 
access the information and, an access necessarily involves the making available right, 
thus there must be an implied license to it.68 
Similarly, in the Bundesgerichtshof Google Images case69, a German artist 
displayed samples of her work on her website and claimed that she did not want her 
artistic work to be indexed by Google and displayed, in the form of thumbnail images, 
as search results following users’ queries. The Federal Supreme Court held that, 
although the showing of thumbnail images by Google’ s image search engine infringed 
the artist’ s making available right, the circumstance that the rightholder had made the 
works available on the internet without resorting to any technological measure to 
prevent indexing, sufficed to show that she had given her implied consent to such 
activity; therefore, she could not later object to linking by unauthorized third parties.  
                                                          
65 Arezzo, E. (2014) Hyperlinks and making available right in the European Union – what future for the 
Internet after Svensson? International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp.7. 
66 Recital 30 of the Information Society Directive states that “the rights referred to in this Directive may be 
transferred, assigned or subject to the granting of contractual licenses, without prejudice to the relevant 
national legislation on copyright and related rights”. That is to say, the idea of an implied license will 
depend on the respective national law of every Member State, since copyright contract law is not yet 
harmonized around Europe.  
67 British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd v Armstrong Patents Company Ltd and Another (1986) A.C. 577, 
HL. 
68 Deveci, A. H. (2004) Hyperlinks oscillating at the crossroads. Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review, pp.7.  
69 The original text of the decision, together with a summary in English is available in Zimbehl, Ph. (2010) 
Google Images. Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court) https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-1-3-
2010/2798/ZimbehlGoogleImages.pdf. 
24 
 
In the Svensson case, the CJEU concluded that the linking performed was not 
infringing since the copyright holder did not require the insertion of restriction 
measures. The CJEU’ s reasoning was based on the “new public” element rather than 
on the implied license doctrine. Particularly, the Court explained that if users to whom 
the works have been communicated by means of a clickable link could access those 
works directly on the very first site on which they were initially communicated, without 
the involvement of the party providing clickable links to such material, the users of the 
site managed by the latter must be deemed to be potential recipients of the initial 
communication and, therefore, as being part of the public taken into account by the 
copyright holders when they authorized the initial communication. In other words, the 
CJEU did not take into account the fact that the rightholder’s behaviour gave third 
parties acting in good faith the impression that she agreed to a widespread diffusion of 
her work, but it only devoted attention to whether the rightholder has decided to make 
the protected work openly accessible on a large scale or not.70 
In conclusion, it seems that according to the CJEU the provision of a clickable 
link, although amounting to an act of communication of the work, can be infringing only 
if the linked content has initially been uploaded on the net with restriction measures 
that has the effect of making it available only to a restricted set of users. In contrast, if 
the copyright holder has permitted widespread circulation of the work, as typically 
happens when the protected content is put on the internet without any restriction 
measures, it must be deemed that all internauts count as potential viewers, so that 
linking cannot possibly enlarge the set of users of the work.71 
What does “restricting public access” actually mean? 
Finally, the CJEU did not make clear exactly what constitutes a website publisher 
“restricting public access”. Therefore, the question whether the existence of 
subscription terms or other contractual restrictions on the original site would be 
sufficient on their own to amount to “access restrictions”, remained.  
Although this issue was not explicitly addressed in the CJEU’ s judgment, it 
would appear consistent with the Court’ s reasoning to conclude that contractual 
restrictions may not in themselves suffice. Particularly, the Court’ s judgment refers to 
author’s exclusive right to authorize or prohibit any communication to the public of their 
                                                          
70 Arezzo, E. (2014) Hyperlinks and making available right in the European Union – what future for the 
Internet after Svensson? International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp.8. 
 71 Arezzo, E. (2014) Hyperlinks and making available right in the European Union – what future for the 
Internet after Svensson? International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp.8.  
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works. If, then, the author’s initial communication of their work to the public is made on 
the condition that contractual terms prohibit hyperlinking to the work, the existence of 
such contractual restrictions may be sufficient for a court to decide that the initial 
website is not freely accessible or freely available after all. As such, it remains a 
possibility that a statement on a website expressly prohibiting hyperlinking to a 
copyright work could mean that such a hyperlink then potentially infringes the author’s 
rights under article 3(1) of the Directive.72 
 
1.2 THE C MORE ENTERTAINMENT AB CASE (C-279/13)73 
Similarly, to the Svensson case, the Swedish Supreme Court submitted to the 
European Court of Justice another preliminary question in the case opposing C More 
Entertainment AB to Linus Sandberg.  
1.2.1 The facts of the case  
C More Entertainment was a company running its own website. The company bought 
the right to stream ice-hockey matches “live” and make these matches available to its 
paying customers by allowing them to click on a link that would take them to a webpage 
placed behind a pay-wall. The defendant (Linus Sandberg) decided to provide a link to 
this page that would allow its visitors to watch the matches C More Entertainment 
streaming for free.74  
1.2.2 The referral 
The Swedish Supreme Court referred five questions75 to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling. The main thrust of the reference was: (1) whether the insertion of hyperlinks on 
                                                          
72 Baker, A. (2014) EU Copyright Directive: can a hyperlink be a “communication to the public? Computer 
and Telecommunications Law Review, pp.4. 
73 Case C-279/13 C More Entertainment AB v Linus Sandberg, Request for a preliminary ruling from the 
Hogsta domstolen (Sweden), lodged on 22 May 2013.  
74 Stamatoudi, I. (2014) ‘Linking’, ‘Framing’ and ‘Browsing’. The EU Court of Justice’ s Recent Case Law. 
Offprint of article from LIBER AMICORUM JAN ROSEN, pp.772. 
75 The questions that were referred to the Court of Justice are set out below: 
1. “Does the expression communication to the public, within the meaning of Article 3(I) of the 
Information Society Directive, include measures to make available on a website open to the 
public of clickable link to a work which is broadcast by the holder of the copyright in that work? 
2.  Is the manner in which the linking is done relevant to the answer to question I? 
3. Is it relevant if the access to the work to which the linking is done is in any way restricted? 
4. May the Member States give wider protection to the exclusive right of right-holders by enabling 
“communication to the public” to cover a greater range of acts than provided for in Article 3(I) of 
the Information Society Directive? 
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internet sites constituted an act of communication to the public, and (2) whether the 
Member State may give wider protection to the exclusive right of authors by enabling 
communication to the public to cover a greater range of acts than provided for in the 
Copyright Directive. However, when the Svensson case was decided, the Swedish 
Court withdrew four out of the five questions it referred and the CJEU proceeded only 
with the question contained in (2) above.76    
1.2.3 The judgment  
To reach its judgment, the CJEU took into account that: a) the objective of the 
Information Society Directive is not to remove or prevent differences between national 
legislations which do not adversely affect the functioning of the internal market77 and, 
b) neither article 3(2) of the Information Society Directive nor any other provision 
thereof states that EU legislature seeks to harmonize and prevent or remove any 
differences between the national legislations as regards the extent of the protection 
which the Member States may grant to the holders of the rights referred to in article 
3(2)(d).78 Based on these considerations, the CJEU answered that Member States 
could provide for more protective provisions in respect of the broadcasting and 
communication to the public provided that such an extension does not undermine the 
protection of copyright.  
1.2.4 Conclusions  
The CJEU’s judgment in C More Entertainment case wasn’ t much of a surprise since 
the broadcast was not offered on a freely accessible basis, but C More had confirmed 
that there was no free rein in terms of linking to all content on the internet. This case 
confirmed that in order to effectively limit the exploitation of copyright protected works 
by means of hyperlinking, right holders should restrict access to the works using 
paywalls and other technical measures. However, the C More case did not enlighten 
us further on questions such as the efficacy of other types of restrictions such as 
                                                          
5. May the Member States give wider protection to the exclusive right of authors by enabling 
“communication to the public” to cover a greater range of acts than provided in Article 3(I) of the 
Information Society Directive?”. 
76Joshy, Th. (2015) Hyperlinking to paywall protected live broadcasts   
http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/wipit/hyperlinking-to-paywall-protected-live-broadcasts/ 
77 Ibid 
78 Case C-279/13 C More Entertainment AB v Linus Sandberg. Judgment of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (2015), para. 31. 
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restrictions included in the license terms and conditions of a “freely accessible” 
targeted website.79 
 
1.3 THE GS MEDIA CASE (C-160/15)80 
On 8 September 2016, the CJEU delivered a landmark ruling in the GS Media case on 
hyperlinks and copyright infringement.   
1.3.1. The facts of the case 
In the GS Media case, the defendant (GS Media) was the operator of a popular Dutch 
gossip website called GeenStijl. Sanoma, which was publishing the Playboy magazine, 
objected to the publication by the GeenStijl website of hyperlinks to other websites 
hosting unpublished photographs of media personality Britt Dekker, over which 
Sanoma had the rights and which it intended to publish in a forthcoming issue of 
Playboy. Despite Sanoma’ s demands, GS Media refused to remove the hyperlinks 
from the website.81 
The dispute was initially heard in the Amsterdam District Court and was 
subsequently appealed to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal and the Dutch Supreme 
Court, before being referred to the CJEU. 
1.3.2 The referral 
The case’ s reference82 for a preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation of article 
3(1) of the Information Society Directive and in particular, whether, and in what 
                                                          
79Joshy, Th. (2015) Hyperlinking to paywall protected live broadcasts     
http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/wipit/hyperlinking-to-paywall-protected-live-broadcasts/ 
80 Case C-160/15GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy Enterprises International Inc., 
Britt Geertruida Dekker, Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 
lodged on 8 September 2016. 
81 Day J. (2016) The CJEU’s Decision in GS Media: Connecting the Dots on Hyperlinking 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=099ff0bb-20f5-42c2-8f3d-3f82b9193d13 
82 The questions that were asked by the Dutch Supreme Court are: 
1(a)  If anyone other than the copyright holder refers by means of a hyperlink on a website controlled 
by him to a website which is managed by a third party and is accessible to the general internet 
public, on which the work has been made available without the consent of the rightholder, does 
that constitute a ‘communication to the public’ within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 
2001/29? 
1(b)  Does it make any difference if the work was also not previously communicated, with the 
rightholder's consent, to the public in some other way? 
1(c)  Is it important whether the 'hyperlinker' is or ought to be aware of the lack of consent by the 
rightholder for the placement of the work on the third party's website mentioned in 1(a) above 
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circumstances, posting on a website a hyperlink to protected works, which are freely 
available on another website without the consent of the copyright holder, constitutes a 
“communication to the public” within the meaning of article 3(1) of the Information 
Society Directive.83 
1.3.3 The judgment  
The CJEU, as held in Svensson, reviewed the law on communication to the public as 
requiring both an “act of communication” and a “new public”, but also noted that an 
“individual assessment” should be applied in each case. To this end, the CJEU 
concluded that it is a key consideration whether the user knew or ought to know that 
the works in question were only already available owing to unlawful activity. Thus, 
when the posting of a hyperlink to a work freely available on another website is carried 
out by a person who, in so doing, does not pursue a profit, such a person does not 
know and cannot reasonably know that that work had been published on the internet 
without the consent of the copyright holder, therefore he does not, as a general rule, 
intervene in full knowledge of the consequences of his conduct in order to give 
customers access to a work illegally posted on the internet. In contrast, when 
hyperlinks are posted for profit, it must be presumed84 that, that posting has been done 
with the full knowledge of the protected nature of the work and of the possible lack of 
the copyright holder’ s consent to publication on the internet. In such circumstances, 
and in so far as this presumption is not rebutted, the act of posting a clickable link to a 
work illegally published on the internet constitutes a “communication to the public”. In 
                                                          
and, as the case may be, of the fact that the work has also not previously been communicated, 
with the rightholder's consent, to the public in some other way? 
2(a) If the answer to question 1(a) is in the negative: in that case, is there, or could there be deemed 
to be, a communication to the public if the website to which the hyperlink refers, and thus the 
work, is indeed findable for the general internet public, but not easily so, with the result that the 
publication of the hyperlink greatly facilitates the finding of the work? 
2(b) In answering question 2(a), is it important whether the ‘hyperlinker’ is or ought to be aware of the 
fact that the website to which the hyperlink refers is not easily findable by the general internet 
public? 
3  Are there other circumstances which should be taken into account when answering the question 
whether there is deemed to be a communication to the public if, by means of a hyperlink, access 
is provided to a work which has not previously been communicated to the public with the consent 
of the rightholder? 
83 Day J. (2016) The CJEU’s Decision in GS Media: Connecting the Dots on Hyperlinking 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=099ff0bb-20f5-42c2-8f3d-3f82b9193d13 
84 It may be expected that the person who posted such a link, should carry out the checks necessary to 
ensure that the work concerned is not illegally published.  
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addition, the CJEU concluded that where it is established that the user knew or ought 
to have known the hyperlink posted provides access to a work illegally published, the 
provision of that link constitutes a “communication to the public”. The same applies if 
that link allows users to circumvent the restrictive measures taken by the site where 
the protected work is posted in order to restrict the public’ s access to its own 
subscribers.85 
1.3.4 Conclusions 
To conclude, GS Media confirmed that Svensson applies only to the situation where 
the works linked to, were made freely available with the consent of the rightholder. 
However, the CJEU recognized that it is impossible or impracticable to find out whether 
a work is online with or without the rightholder’s permission.86 In that regard, the CJEU 
directed that there should be a presumption that the user ought to know the status of 
consent, where he/she is profiting or is seeking to profit, financially from providing the 
hyperlinks. In other words, it should be part of the due diligence, where the hyperlinking 
forms part of a commercial exercise, to check that the works to which hyperlinks are 
provided, are already online with the consent of the rightholder. Even if the goal is not 
financial gain, then the user might still be culpable, where it is on actual notice, or 
should otherwise have known that the works hyperlinked to, are online unlawfully.87 
In this way, the CJEU ensured that the freedom to hyperlink is necessarily 
curbed. Where a hyperlink gives access to a work that should not already be online, 
and the user knows (or ought to know) that; or where that party seeks to profit from 
providing the link and therefore should have known that the original work is unlawfully 
online, this can be deemed to be a communication to a (new) public. The public that is 
                                                          
85 Press Release (92/2016) Judgment in Case C-160/15 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, 
Playboy Enterprises International Inc., Britt Geertruida Dekker. Court of Justice of the European Union, 
Luxembourg.  
86 Particularly, the CJEU stated, “it may be difficult, in particular for individuals who wish to post such links, 
to ascertain whether website to which those links are expected to lead, provides access to works which 
are protected and, if necessary, whether the copyright holders of those works have consented to their 
posting on the internet. Such ascertaining is all the more difficult where those rights have been the subject 
of sub-licenses. Moreover, the content of a website to which a hyperlink enables access may be changed 
after the creation of that link, including the protected works, without the person who created that link 
necessarily being aware of it”, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy Enterprises 
International Inc., Britt Geertruida Dekker, para. 46. 
87 Nuttall, E. (2016) Case report: Hyperlinking and the role of intention and knowledge. Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review, pp.3. 
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seeing the work online is not that contemplated by the rightholder. On that basis, 
intentional, deliberate, proliferation of unlawful copyright infringement is caught.88 
 
2. FRAMING: THE BESTWATER INTERNATIONAL CASE (C-348/13)89 
On 21 October 2014, the CJEU issued its decision in the BestWater case following a 
request for a preliminary ruling from the German Supreme Court.    
2.1 The facts of the case 
The dispute in BestWater arose from the display of a short video about water pollution, 
created by BestWater International, which produces and sells water filters. The video 
appeared on YouTube, apparently without knowledge or authorization by BestWater 
and was used by a competitor, who linked to the clip by means of “framing”, thereby 
making the clip visible on its own website. BestWater claimed copyright infringement 
of its clip and sought an injunction from the German courts. The defendant had 
meanwhile voluntarily ceased the use of the clip and the procedure was therefore 
limited to the restitution of damages.90  
2.2 The referral 
The German Supreme Court referred to the CJEU the question whether where there 
is no transmission to a new public and no use of different technical means, the 
technique used by the defendants could amount to a communication to the public 
under the Information Society Directive and in a way that would require the 
rightholder’s consent.91 92 
                                                          
88 Nuttall, E. (2016) Case report: Hyperlinking and the role of intention and knowledge. Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review, pp.3. 
89 Case C-348/13 BestWater International GmbH v Michael Mebes and Stefan Potsch, Request for a 
preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 25 June 2013. 
90 Ruijsenaars, H. (2014) European Court: Linking by ”framing” is not a copyright infringement. EBU 
Operating Eurovision and Euroradio https://www.ebu.ch/contents/news/2014/10/european-court-linking-
by-framin.html. 
91 Mazzola, L. (2015) BestWater for linking or framing content: BestWater International GmbH v Michael 
Mebes and Stefan Potsch. Entertainment Law Review, pp.2. 
92 The question that was referred to the Court of Justice is set out below: “Does the embedding, within 
one’ s own website, of another person’ s work made available to the public on a third-party website, in 
circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, constitute communication to the public within the 
meaning of Article 3(1) of the 2001 Copyright Directive (2001/29/EC), even where that other person’ s 
work is not thereby communicated to a new public and the communication of the work does not use a 
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2.3 The order 
The CJEU answered the referral in BestWater by way of a “reasoned order”.93 It 
considered that the technique used by the defendants raised the same issues in terms 
of copyright infringement as the provision of clickable links in Svensson and, therefore, 
it restated and applied the principles set out in detail in Svensson’ s judgment. 
Particularly, BestWater’s video was available to all internet users before the 
defendants’ alleged “communication” because it was freely accessible on YouTube. 
Therefore, there was no “new public” to which the work was communicated as a result 
of the defendant’s actions. Nor was there a different technical means, as the 
communication remained via the internet. Consequently, there was no infringing 
copying because the defendants were making the video available directly from 
YouTube.94 
2.4 Conclusions  
The Court’s order raises several issues whereas questions remained unaddressed.  
First of all, one would have hoped that the Court had seized this opportunity to 
differentiate its reasoning in the Svensson case and clearly distinguish between mere 
hyperlinking and framing. In the Svensson case, the CJEU determined that any form 
of hyperlink is in principle subject to the communication to the public right unless there 
is no “new public”. This reasoning seems very far-reaching given that a hyperlink is, 
as such, no more than a technical tool to switch from one URL address to another. By 
contrast, the framing technique (in particular of audio or video streams provided by 
another website) is markedly different from hyperlinking, because in this case the end-
user is not directed to the webpage where the original content is placed. That makes 
                                                          
specific technical means which differs from that of the original communication?”, BestWater International 
GmbH v Michael Mebes and Stefan Potsch, para. 11 
93 The CJEU’ s rules of procedure (Rules) provide a means for the CJEU to reply to a referral by a national 
court by reasoned order only (not a hearing and detailed judgment) in limited circumstances. Those 
circumstances include where the question referred by national court in “identical to a question on which 
the court has already ruled” (Rules art. 99), Mazzola, L. (2015) BestWater for linking or framing content: 
BestWater International GmbH v Michael Mebes and Stefan Potsch. Entertainment Law Review, pp.2. 
94 Mazzola, L. (2015) BestWater for linking or framing content: BestWater International GmbH v Michael 
Mebes and Stefan Potsch. Entertainment Law Review, pp.2. 
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this type of communication more clearly an economic form of exploitation, which is a 
crucial distinction.95 96 
Secondly, the question of whether embedding copyrighted videos available on 
the Internet would ever be tantamount to copyright infringement remained open in 
cases where the source video was uploaded without permission of the right owner. In 
this regard, it is remarkable that the CJEU recognized, but did not validate, the 
BestWater’s claim that it had not authorized the clip to be uploaded on YouTube, as 
this fact could and should have been taken into account for the question of a “new 
public”.  
In addition, the wording of the request for a preliminary ruling by the German 
Supreme Court explicitly referred to the given circumstances of the actual case. Did 
the Court wish to indicate that as long as the copyright owner had not ordered YouTube 
to take the clip down it was considered tolerated and thereby lawfully available for 
everyone’s free use? And what if, though such a take-down order had been given, the 
clip re-appeared on YouTube or any other social network, as is often the case? It is 
difficult to imagine that the Court wished to suggest that the lawfulness of the first 
uploading of the original content is entirely irrelevant.97 
Finally, the lawfulness of embedding copyright – protected content subject to 
conditional access, e.g. the website hosting the source video was protected by a 
technological measure designed to prevent or restrict access, was not addressed.  
 
3. BROWSING: THE MELTWATER CASE (C-360/13)98 
On June 5, 2014, the CJEU handed down its judgment on the application of Directive 
2001/29 to internet browsing; specifically, the creation and temporary storage of copies 
of copyright material on a computer monitor (on-screen copies) and in the computer’s 
“cache” on the hard disk drive (cached copies).  
                                                          
95 In the TVCatchup case (C-607/11), the question whether the third-party’s re-use of a broadcast 
programme was a communication under Article 3 of the Information Society Directive, the question of a 
“new public” was not held relevant.  
96 Ruijsenaars, H. (2014) European Court: Linking by ”framing” is not a copyright infringement. EBU 
Operating Eurovision and Euroradio https://www.ebu.ch/contents/news/2014/10/european-court-linking-
by-framin.html. 
97 Ibid  
98 C-360/13 Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd  (Meltwater). 
Court of Justice of the European Union (2014). 
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3.1 The facts of the case 
The case involved a dispute between Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd 
(PRCA) and Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd (NLA) (and others). The PRCA was an 
industry body for public relations professionals and was a party to these proceedings 
on behalf of its members in respect of their use of media monitoring services offered 
by the Meltwater group of companies (Meltwater). The NLA was a collective licensing 
agency which licensed copyright material and collected royalties on behalf of 
newspapers publishers in the United Kingdom. While Meltwater had, after a period of 
refusing to do so, agreed to purchase a license from the NLA in respect of its provision 
of the media monitoring service to its customers (including PRCA members), the PRCA 
maintained that the online receipt of the monitoring reports by Meltwater’ s customers 
did not require a separate license.99 
Following lengthy litigation in the UK courts, the UK Supreme Court concluded 
that both on-screen copies and cached copies of copyright material satisfy the 
conditions of the exemption in article 5(1) of the Information Society Directive.100 
Nevertheless, recognizing that the issue had a transnational dimension, the UK 
Supreme Court referred a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
3.2 The referral 
The referral was focusing on the applicability of Article 5(1) of the Information Society 
Directive on temporary acts of reproductions and Article 5(5) of the same Directive on 
the three-step test, rather than the legality of linking to protected subject matter.101 In 
particular, the CJEU was asked whether copies made automatically on screen and in 
the Internet “cache” memory of one’ s computer when browsing material on the Internet 
come within the scope of the exception (found in article 5(1) of the Information Society 
                                                          
99 C-360/13 Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd  (Meltwater). 
Court of Justice of the European Union (2014) at [10].  
100 Baker, A. (2014) EU Copyright Directive: does internet browsing require copyright licences? Public 
Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd (C-360/13) (the Meltwater 
case). Entertainment Law Review, pp.1. 
101 Mezei, P. (2016) Enter the matrix: the effects of the CJEU’ s case law on linking and streaming 
technologies. Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice, pp.8.  
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Directive) for temporary and transient or incidental copies forming an integral part of a 
technological process.102 103 
3.3 The judgment 
The CJEU, relying on earlier case law104, held that article 5(1) of the Information 
Society Directive must be interpreted strictly as it is “a derogation from the general rule 
established by the Directive, that the copyright holder must authorize any reproduction 
of his protected work”.105 What is more, the CJEU established an overarching principle, 
that article 5(1) must allow and ensure the development and operation of new 
technologies and safeguard a fair balance between the rights and interests of rights 
holders and of users of protected works who wish to avail themselves of those 
technologies.106 
Temporary act of reproduction? 
Specifically, the CJEU concluded that both the on-screen and cached copies were 
temporary, given that the on-screen copies were automatically deleted as soon as the 
internet user moved away from the website, and cached copies were also normally 
                                                          
102 “In circumstances where: 
         an end-user views a web-page without downloading, printing or otherwise setting out to make a copy 
of it; 
         copies of that web-page are automatically made on screen and in the Internet “cache” on the end-
user’s hard disk; 
         the creation of those copies is indispensable to the technical processes involved in correct and 
efficient Internet browsing; 
         the screen copy remains on screen until the end-user moves away from the relevant web-page, 
when it is automatically deleted by the normal operation of the computer; and 
         the copies are retained for no longer than the ordinary processes associated with Internet use 
referred to at (iv) and (v) above continue; 
         Are such copies (i) temporary, (ii) transient or incidental and (iii) an integral and essential part of the 
technological process within the meaning of Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC?” 
103 Stamatoudi, I. (2014) ‘Linking’, ‘Framing’ and ‘Browsing’. The EU Court of Justice’ s Recent Case Law.  
Offprint of article from LIBER AMICORUM JAN ROSEN, pp.776. 
104 C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (2009) E.C.R I-6569, (2009) E.C.D.R. 
16; and C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure; and Karen 
Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (2011) E.C.R I-9083; (2012) 1 C.M.L.R. 29 
105 Baker, A. (2014) EU Copyright Directive: does internet browsing require copyright licences? Public 
Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd (C-360/13) (the Meltwater 
case). Entertainment Law Review, pp.2. 
106 Hart, M. (2014) The legality of internet browsing in the digital age. European Intellectual Property 
Review, pp.11. 
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automatically replaced by other content after a certain time, even though this would be 
affected by the capacity of the cache and on the extent and the frequency of internet 
usage by the internet user concerned.107 
Transient or incidental? 
In addition, it reached that on-screen caches were transient even though the 
technological process and copies remained in existence for as long as the browser 
remained open, determining that the duration of the caching was still limited to what is 
necessary for the technical process concerned to work properly while cached copies 
were held to be incidental in light of the technical process used because they neither 
exist independently nor have an independent purpose outside internet browsing.108  
An integral and essential part of a technological process? 
What is more, it stated that cached copies form an integral part of internet browsing, 
as they facilitate access to contents online109 since the acts of reproduction were 
carried out wholly in the context of the implementation of a technological process and 
the on-screen and cached copies were created and deleted by the technological 
process used for viewing websites and were made entirely in the context of that 
process110. Furthermore, the completion of those acts was necessary because without 
the cached copies the internet would be unable to cope with current volumes of data 
transmitted online, rendering the process used for viewing websites considerably less 
efficient. Similarly, the technology enabling the viewing of websites on computers 
required on-screen copies to be made if it is to function correctly and efficiently.111 
 
 
 
                                                          
107 James, S (2014) And breathe… you can continue browsing the internet, as the CJEU hands down its 
decision in PRCA v NLA (Meltwater). Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, pp.2. 
108 Ibid, p.3. 
109 Case C-360/13 Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd and 
Others, Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 June 2014, para. 28-38. 
110 James, S. (2014) And breathe… you can continue browsing the internet, as the CJEU hands down its 
decision in PRCA v NLA (Meltwater). Computer and Telecommunications Law Review, pp.3. 
111 Hart, M. (2014) The legality of internet browsing in the digital age. European Intellectual Property 
Review, pp.11. 
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Satisfying the conditions set out in article 5(5) of the Copyright Directive– the 
three-step test 
Although the Supreme Court’s reference did not include any question relating to article 
5(5) of the Information Society Directive, the CJEU held that on-screen and cached 
copies must also fulfil the components of the three-step test.  
Specifically, the CJEU found that since these forms of copies are created only 
for the purpose of viewing websites, they were held to constitute a special case. 
Moreover, the copies were held not to reasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
those rightholders because the works are made available to internet users by the 
publishers of the websites who must obtain authorization from the copyright holders 
as that making available constitutes a restricted communication of the public, so their 
legitimate interests are safeguarded.112 Similarly, the creation of on-screen copies and 
cached copies does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the copyright works, with 
the on-screen and cached copies making it “possible for internet users to avail 
themselves of the communication to the public made by the publisher of the website 
concerned”.113 
3.4 Conclusions  
In summary, the CJEU’s judgment in the Meltwater case confirmed that the copies of 
copyright material which are created on a computer screen in order for webpages to 
be viewed by an internet user and the copies which are created in the cache of that 
internet user’s computer hard disk in the course of viewing a website will benefit from 
the exemption to copyright infringement as set out in article 5(1) of the Information 
Society Directive, on the basis that such copies satisfy the conditions of article 5(1) as 
well as the conditions set out in article 5(5). Consequently, such copies may be made 
without the authorization of the copyright holders.114 
Undoubtfully, this decision is, in many ways, a resounding victory for common 
sense. The CJEU, in terms of both the law and the case itself, looked at the bigger 
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picture, focusing on whether the copying was integral or essential to the technological 
process. A decision otherwise would almost certainly have damaged Europe’s 
attractiveness as a centre of commerce. In so doing, the CJEU gave a somewhat 
elastic interpretation of article 5(1) of the Information Society Directive, particularly 
around its findings that on-screen copies were transient even though they remained in 
existence for as long as the internet users kept their browser open and despite the fact 
that it had already made clear that the exceptions should be interpreted restrictively. 
Furthermore, article 5(5) of the Information Society Directive played a big role with the 
CJEU making it clear that it needs to be satisfied in addition to article 5(1). The key to 
satisfying the requirements of article 5(1) appears to be making sure that authorization 
has been sought at some level. If this were not the case, then there would have been 
the unsatisfactory and impractical consequence that internet users would not be able 
to browse content on the internet without the copyright owner’s consent.115 
In any case, the limits of this CJEU’s judgment should be borne in mind. The 
case concerned the application of article 5(1) to the browsing of websites only; 
downloading, forwarding or printing out the content of a website, as well as any kind of 
commercial exploitation of it, will fall outside of the article 5(1) exemption and/or fail to 
satisfy the additional conditions set out in article 5(5). In the context of data aggregation 
services, such as the media monitoring service provided by Meltwater, it is clear that 
those providing such services to customers will still need to obtain the consent or 
authorization of the relevant right holders. Moreover, those customers will still need to 
obtain a license to receive services which involve the delivery of copies other than on-
screen copies and cached copies. It remains, therefore, to be seen whether the 
recipients of copyright materials in other online contexts, such as the end-users of 
media streaming services provided by a service provider akin to Meltwater, might try 
to use the Meltwater case to argue that their receipt of streamed content does not 
require the authorization of the rightholder, even if the provider is licensed.116  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
There is no doubt that the creation and ever-increasing importance of the internet have 
created great challenges for intellectual property law. Some of these challenges result 
from the need to apply established principles of intellectual property law to questions 
that the framers of the legislation could not have envisaged. Others derive simply from 
the nature of the internet.117 
This being the case, in recent years the CJEU has issued some interesting, yet 
controversial rulings attempting to interpret EU copyright law and balance the rights 
and interests of the various stakeholders. By doing so, the CJEU interpreted the 
reproduction right and the concept of communication to the public, as well as the 
exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights more or less restrictively based on the 
actual facts of each case. In addition, it turned to other complementary criteria, such 
as the profit-making nature of the activity, the existence of an intentional, deliberate 
and indispensable intervention by the operator, the existence of a new public as well 
as of new technical means different from that of the original communications.118 
Even though the CJEU‘s judgments seemed to have favoured the rights of the 
users over those of the rightholders due to the inherent benefits of distribution of 
knowledge that the internet seeks to perform, it did appear to sufficiently protect the 
interests of the rightholders too. The fact that linking is only lawful if the information is 
freely available online and the decisions appear only to apply when the initial act of 
communication was done under the authority of the rightholder as well as the 
presumption of knowledge of illegal publications in the case that the hyperlinks are 
provided for profit, are important caveats that the CJEU included in its decisions to 
protect proprietors’ legitimate interests.119   
However, and in spite of its attempt to safeguard a fair balance between the 
rights and interests of rightholders and of users who wish to avail themselves of these 
new technologies, the CJEU’ s rulings on linking, framing and browsing tend to become 
overcomplicated, where arguments might be acceptable under some of the instances, 
whilst others might favour the opposite result. Particularly, concepts of public, making 
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available to the public, prohibition of evasion of technical restrictions are properly used 
by the CJEU. Conversely, theories of “new public” as well as “communication to the 
public by same technical means” appear controversial and give rise to some 
perplexities.120 
What it can be said is that in the CJEU’ s judgments the common sense 
prevailed. This is because, if alternative answers were found, then the actions of 
hundreds of ordinary people who link and browse the internet every day, would have 
been to blame for copyright infringement. By doing so, the CJEU acknowledged the 
importance of the goals of the Information Society Directive by establishing the 
overarching principle that article 5(1) of the Directive must allow and ensure the 
development and operation of new technologies and safeguard a fair balance of rights 
and interests between the different categories of rightholders, as well as between the 
different categories of rightholders and users of protected subject-matter. In addition, 
it considered that the fact of categorizing all posting links to works published on other 
websites as “communication to the public” in the case where the copyright holders of 
those works have not consented to that publication on the internet, would have highly 
restrictive consequences for freedom of expression and on information and would not 
be consistent with the right balance which the Information Society Directive seeks to 
establish.121  
To conclude, the challenges thrown up by the new communicative technologies 
of the internet have been increasing owing to the accessibility of the internet from any 
place around the world and instant reproduction and recognition abilities. The CJEU 
has tried to protect the interests of the proprietors and the users in the diverse issues 
that have cropped up; however, it is still difficult to predict with certainty the nature of 
the issues that may be faced in the future.122  In any case, one can only welcome the 
efforts of the CJEU in harmonizing EU copyright law. Even though there are some who 
call the CJEU an “activist” court whereas others assert that it is going too far and 
stepping on the role of the EU legislator, taking into account the partial, fragmented 
and slow harmonization achieved and considering that full harmonization of copyright 
in the EU in the form of a single copyright code and title appears to be a long-term 
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target, the role of the CJEU has been fundamental in shaping EU copyright law.123 
What is left now is a good, well drafted law to keep up with the technological progress.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
123 Xalabarder, R. (2016) The Role of the CJEU in harmonizing EU copyright law. International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, pp.3.  
41 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
BOOKS 
Bently, L. and Sherman B. (2008) Intellectual property law. Oxford University Press. 
Cornish, W., Llewelyn, D., and Alpin, T. (2010) Intellectual property: patents, copyright, 
trademarks and allied rights. Sweet & Maxwell, London. 
Dreier, T., Hugenholtz P. B. (2016) Concise European copyright law. Kluwer Law 
International. 
Ficsor, M. (2002) The law of copyright and the Internet: the 1996 WIPO treaties, their 
interpretation and implementation. Oxford University Press. 
Gervais, D. (2016) Collective management of copyright and related rights. Kluwer Law 
International. 
Jacob, S. R., Alexander, D., and Lane L. (2004) A guidebook to intellectual property. 
Sweet & Maxwell, London.  
Kotsiris, L. (2005) Intellectual property law. Sakkoulas, Athens. 
Koumantos, G. (2014) Greek copyright law. Sakkoulas, Athens – Thessaloniki. 
Kur, A. and Dreier Th. (2013) European intellectual property law: text, cases and 
materials. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (UK).  
Macmillan, F. and Bowrey, K. (2006) New directions in copyright law. Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham (UK) – Northampton (US).  
Rosati, E. (2013) Originality in EU Copyright: Full Harmonization through Case Law. 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (UK) – Northampton, MA (USA). 
Sidiropoulos T. (2003) Internet law. Sakkoulas, Athens – Thessaloniki. 
Stamatoudi, A. I. (2016) New developments in EU and International Copyright Law. 
Wolters Kluwer. 
Stamatoudi, I. (2015) Copyright and the digital agenda for Europe: current regulations 
and challenges for the future. Sakkoulas, Athens. 
Stamatoudi, I. and Torremans, P. (2014) EU Copyright Law: a commentary. Edward 
Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (UK) – Northampton (US).  
Stamatoudi, A. I. (2010) Copyright enforcement and the Internet. Kluwer Law 
International. 
42 
 
Stokes, S. (2014) Digital copyright: law and practice. Hart Publishing, Oxford (UK). 
Torremans, P. (2007) Copyright law: a handbook of contemporary research. Edward 
Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (UK) – Northampton (US).  
 
ARTICLES 
 
Afori, O. (2009) Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in Copyright Law. 25 
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal.  
 
Akdeniz, Y. (1997) To Link or Not to Link: Problems with the World Wide Web Links 
on the Internet. International Review of Law, Computers and Technology.  
 
Arezzo, E. (2014) Hyperlinks and making available right in the European Union – what 
future for the Internet after Svensson? International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law. 
 
Association Litteraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI) (2014) Report and Opinion on 
the making available and communication to the public in the internet environment: 
focus on linking techniques on the Internet. European Intellectual Property Review.  
 
Baker, A. (2014) EU Copyright Directive: can a hyperlink be a “communication to the 
public”? Computer and Telecommunications Law Review. 
 
Baker, A. (2014) EU Copyright Directive: does internet browsing require copyright 
licences? Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing 
Agency Ltd (C-360/13) (the Meltwater case). Entertainment Law Review. 
 
Ball, V. (2016) Striking the balance while browsing online: recent ECJ decisions.  
Birmingham Student Law Review.  
 
Clark, S. (2011) Just browsing? An analysis of the reasoning underlying the Court of 
Appeal’s decision on the temporary copies exemption in Newspaper Licensing Agency 
Ltd v Meltwater Holding BV. European Intellectual Property Review. 
 
Deveci, A. H. (2004) Hyperlinks oscillating at the crossroads. Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review. 
 
Garrote, I. J. (2002) Linking and framing: a comparative law approach. European 
Intellectual Property Review.  
43 
 
Ginsburg, C. J. (2014) Hyperlinking and “making available. European Intellectual 
Property Review. 
 
Hart, M. (2014) The legality of internet browsing in the digital age. European Intellectual 
Property Review. 
 
Hart, M. (2002) The Copyright in the Information Society Directive: an overview. 
European Intellectual Property Review.  
 
Headdon, T. (2016) An epilogue to Svensson: the same old new public and the worms 
that didn’ t turn. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice. 
 
Hoy, R. (2015) Internet blocking injunctions are alive and well in the post Svensson 
world. Entertainment Law Review. 
 
Hugenholtz, P. B. (2000) Caching and copyright: the right of temporary copying.  
European Intellectual Property Review. 
 
James, St. (2014) And breathe… you can continue browsing the internet, as the CJEU 
hands down its decision in PRCA v NLA (Meltwater). Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review. 
 
Mazzola, L. (2015) BestWater practice for linking or framing content: BestWater 
International GmbH v Michael Mebes and Stefan Potsch. Entertainment Law Review. 
 
Mezei, P. (2016) Enter the matrix: the effects of the CJEU’ s case law on linking and 
streaming technologies. Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice. 
 
Moir, A., Montagnon, R. and Newton, H. (2014) Communication to the public: the CJEU 
finds linking to material already “freely available” cannot be restricted by copyright 
owners: Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB (C-466/12). European 
Intellectual Property Review.  
 
Nuttall, E. (2016) Case report: Hyperlinking and the role of intention and knowledge.  
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review. 
 
Pessach, G. (2003) The author’s moral right of integrity in cyberspace – a preliminary 
normative framework. International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law. 
 
44 
 
Pila, J. (2012) Copyright and internet browsing. Law Quartely Review. 
 
Pihlajarinne, T. (2012) Setting the Limits for the Implied Licence in Copyright and 
Linking Discourse: the European Perspective. International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law.    
 
Sangal, T. (2010) IP issues in linking, framing and keyword linked advertising.  
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review. 
 
Savola, P. (2014) Blocking injunctions and website operator’s liability for copyright 
infringement for user-generated links. European Intellectual Property Review.  
 
Smith, J. and Montagnon, R. (2013) The Supreme Court’s opinion on browsing: Public 
Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. European 
Intellectual Property Review. 
 
Snelgrove, M., and Cordell, N., (2015) Intellectual Property and the Internet. European 
Intellectual Property Review. 
 
Stamatoudi, I. (2014) ‘Linking’, ‘Framing’ and ‘Browsing’. The EU Court of Justice’ s 
Recent Case Law. Offprint of article from LIBER AMICORUM JAN ROSEN.  
 
Stanganelli, M., (2012) Spreading the news online: a fine balance of copyright and 
freedom of expression in news aggregation. European Intellectual Property Review. 
 
Stokes, S., and Reeves, St. (2013) UK Supreme Court decides web-browsing doesn’t 
infringe copyright but nevertheless refers the matter to the CJEU: PRCA Ltd v The 
NLA.  Entertainment Law Review. 
 
Xalabarder, R. (2016) The role of CJEU in harmonizing EU copyright law. International 
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law. 
 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
Bently, L., Derclaye, E., Dinwoodie, B. G., Dreier, Th., Dussolier, S., Geiger, C.,  
Griffiths, J., Hilty, R., Hugenholtz, P. B., Jansses, M. C., Kretschmer, M., Metzger, A.,  
Peukert, A., Ricolfi, M., Senftleben, M., Strowel, A., Vivant, M. and Xalabarder, R. 
(2013) The Reference to the CJEU in Case C-466/12 Svensson. Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cmf?abstract_id=2220326  
 
45 
 
Chalkia, P. (2015) A review of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union concerning copyright infringements on the internet and the role of Internet 
Service Providers. International Hellenic University, Thessaloniki. 
 
Cohen, E. J. (1996) A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright 
Management" in Cyberspace. 28 Conn. L. Rev 981 https://ssrn.com/abstract=17990 
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.17990.  
 
Day, J. (2016) The CJEU’s Decision in GS Media: Connecting the Dots on Hyperlinking 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=099ff0bb-20f5-42c2-8f3d-
3f82b9193d13 
 
De Wolf & Partners (2013) Study on the application of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
copyright and related rights in the information society (The INFOSOC DIRECTIVE). 
EuropeanUnionhttp://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/studies/131216_st
udy_en.pdf. 
 
European Copyright Society (2013) Opinion on the Reference to the CJEU in Case C-
466/12 Svensson https://europeancopyrightsociety.org/opinion-on-the-reference-to-
the-cjeu-in-case-c-46612-svensson/ 
 
Joshy, Th. (2015) Hyperlinking to paywall protected live broadcasts     
http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/wipit/hyperlinking-to-paywall-protected-live-broadcasts/ 
 
Zachou, M. (2015) Copyright infringements on the internet, file-sharing and the role of 
Internet Service Providers. International Hellenic University, Thessaloniki. 
 
Malama, G. (2013) Copyright aspects of linking and framing. International Hellenic 
University, Thessaloniki. 
 
Michailidou, E. (2013) Copyright infringement through internet. International Hellenic 
University, Thessaloniki. 
 
Press Release (92/2016) Judgment in Case C-160/15 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media 
Netherlands BV, Playboy Enterprises International Inc., Britt Geertruida Dekker.  Court 
of Justice of the European Union, Luxembourg.  
 
Renta, A., Simonelli, F., Mazziotti, G., Bolognini, A. and Luchetta, G. (2015) The 
implementation, application and effects of the EU Directive on copyright in the 
46 
 
information society. Centre for European Policy Studies, European Union  
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR120_0.pdf. 
 
Ruijsenaars, H. (2014) European Court: Linking by ”framing” is not a copyright 
infringement. EBU Operating Eurovision and Euroradio  
https://www.ebu.ch/contents/news/2014/10/european-court-linking-by-framin.html 
 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (2002) Intellectual Property on the 
Internet: A survey of issues htpp://ecommerce.wipo.int.  
Zimbehl, Ph. (2010) Google Images. Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court) 
https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-1-3-2010/2798/ZimbehlGoogleImages.pdf. 
 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 
Directive 2001/29 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society [2001] OJ L 167. 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) (1996) 
WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (1996) 
 
CASES 
 
Case C-160/15 GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy Enterprises 
International Inc., Britt Geertruida Dekker. Court of Justice of the European Union 
(2016).  
 
Case C-279/13 C More Entertainment AB v Linus Sandberg. Court of Justice of the 
European Union (2015).  
 
Case C-360/13 Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd v Newspaper Licensing 
Agency Ltd and Others (Meltwater). Court of Justice of the European Union (2014). 
 
Case C-348/13 BestWater International GmbH v Michael Mebes and Stefan Potsch. 
Court of Justice of the European Union (2013). 
 
Case C-466/12 Nils Svensson v Retriever Sverige AB. Court of Justice of the European 
Union (2014). 
 
47 
 
Case C-607/11 ITV Broadcasting Ltd and others v TV Catchup Ltd (No 2). Court of 
Justice of the European Union (2013). 
 
Case C-429/08 Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd. Court of Justice of the 
European Union (2011). 
 
Case C-403/08 Football Association Premier League Limited & Others v QC Leisure 
& Others. Court of Justice of the European Union (2011). 
 
Case C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening. Court of Justice 
of the European Union (2009). 
 
Case C-306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael 
Hoteles SA. Court of Justice of the European Union (2006). 
 
Trumpet Software Pty Ltd, and Peter Robin Tattam vs. OzEmail Pty Ltd, Sean Martin 
Howard and Dani Lynette Thompson. Federal Court of Australia Tasmania District 
Registry General Division (1996). 
 
British Leyland Motor Corporation Ltd v Armstrong Patents Company Ltd and Another 
(1986) A.C. 577, HL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
